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The U.S. government has a long-standing interest in encouraging research and 
development  (R&D)  by  American  companies.  Congress  feels  that  the 
common-property nature of  the know-how produced by R&D, and the com- 
petitive advantage that  greater R&D affords U.S.  firms in  global markets, 
means that too little R&D is likely to be undertaken by  private firms in the 
absence of  strong government support.'  Concern over the sluggish rate of 
U.S. productivity growth in the 1970s, combined with alarm over rising for- 
eign competition, led Congress to enact two tax changes in 1981 designed to 
stimulate R&D.2 The first, the research and experimentation tax credit, estab- 
lished a 25 percent credit for new research expenditures by  U.S.  firms. The 
second change,  a suspension of Treasury regulation $1.861-8, offered very 
generous tax treatment of  R&D performed in the United States by  certain 
multinational corporations. 
In this paper, I examine the incentives introduced by this second change- 
the suspension of  81.861-8-and  the way  that American multinationals re- 
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1. In theory, the welfare consequences of subsidizing R&D are ambiguous, because some in- 
dustries might attract too much competitive R&D and the presence of foreign competitors raises 
the possibility that foreigners could benefit from domestic subsidies (or in other ways influence 
the domestic market).  See Dixit (1988) and Reinganum  (1989) for surveys of the theory. The 
position of the U.S. Congress is that R&D generates significant positive externalities, a view that 
is consistent with the empirical literature surveyed in Griliches (1991). 
2. Congressional sentiment is described in U.S. Congress (1981). 
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sponded to those incentives. The §1.861-8 rules were modified several times 
between 1986 and 1990 in a manner that affected only certain firms, so it is 
possible to infer the effect of the law by observing the responses of different 
companies to the changes. Based on these results, it appears that American 
multinationals significantly changed their R&D expenditures in  response to 
tax policy in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the 1981 change may not have had the 
intended effect of  greatly increasing R&D activity in the United States. In 
part,  this may be  due to some misunderstandings about the incentives that 
were embodied in the law prior to 1981 (and in its modifications after 1986). 
The U.S. government has yet to settle on a permanent tax policy toward the 
R&D activities of  multinational corporations. Congress enacted temporary 
changes in the R&D rules in 1984, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, and 1990; cur- 
rently, the political process is at an impasse in which all sides agree that a 
long-range policy is needed but in which there is no agreement on the policy 
to pursue. This indecisiveness is due in part to the general complexity of tax- 
ing multinational corporations and in part to the difficulty of forging a coher- 
ent approach to R&D performed by  multinationals. The government would 
like to encourage R&D, but there is a feeling that some of the benefits of R&D 
undertaken by U.S. multinationals accrue not to Americans but to foreigners 
who buy products produced by the R&D (and to foreign governments who tax 
the proceeds of those sales). These issues are important in designing national 
R&D policy, since U.S. multinationals perform most of the privately financed 
R&D in the United States. 
There are two reasons why it is instructive to explore the reactions of U.S. 
multinationals to the tax changes. The first is that these firms reveal the price 
sensitivity of  their demand for R&D by  their reactions to the tax changes. 
There is considerable interest in learning the impact of the cost of R&D on the 
level of  R&D performed,  both for its own sake and to identify the effect of 
other, nonprice, factors such as scientific opportunities on the rate and direc- 
tion of R&D. The second reason is that, in designing laws to tax their resident 
multinational corporations, governments must decide on the extent to which 
to permit firms to deduct general expenses against their own tax bases. R&D 
is one important category of such expenses, but there are others, such as in- 
terest charges and administrative overhead. Greater deductions may encour- 
age more business activity but could do so at the cost of lost tax revenue. By 
estimating the price responsiveness of R&D, it is possible to learn what trade- 
offs are involved in designing policy. 
In this paper, I analyze the behavior of a panel of manufacturing firms for 
which comprehensive data are available on R&D histories and foreign busi- 
ness operations. Due to the peculiarities of  the tax code, firms differed in the 
degrees to which they were affected by  the legislative changes after 1986. 
These differences are based largely on the tax rates they face in foreign coun- 
tries. As a result, the legislative changes introduced in the 1980s offer a not 
quite natural experiment by changing the after-tax prices of R&D for a subset 
of firms that is close to randomly selected. The results suggest that the 1986 151  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax  Changes 
and subsequent changes had the predicted effect of discouraging R&D, though 
not dramatically. 
Section 5.1  of the paper reviews some of the history of R&D undertaken by 
U.S. multinational firms. Section 5.2 summarizes elements of the tax system 
that are relevant to R&D by  U.S. multinationals. Section 5.3 then explores 
the incentives introduced by  U.S. law, and section 5.4 estimates the respon- 
siveness of  U.S. firms to those incentives over the period  1984-89.  Section 
5.5 compares the consequences of  current U.S. law to some major alternative 
tax treatments of R&D. Section 5.6 is the conclusion. 
5.1  R&D by U.S. Multinational Firms 
The U.S. government’s 1981 decision to increase the tax subsidy for R&D 
performed in the United States is best understood in the context of the rela- 
tively weak American R&D performance in the 1970s. Table 5.1 contains data 
on annual movements in R&D/GNP for the United States, France, West Ger- 
many,  Japan,  and  the United  Kingdom over the period  1961-87.  For the 
United States, this ratio steadily declined, starting at a value of 2.9 percent in 
1965 and finding its nadir at 2.1 percent in 1977-78.  Over the same period, 
France and the United Kingdom were holding steady at their somewhat lower 
levels of  R&D relative to GNP, while West  Germany and Japan exhibited 
growing R&D intensity. Because Congress feels that an erosion in technolog- 
ical leadership is not in the interest of the United States, it is understandable 
that it was eager to prevent further relative decline in U.S. R&D activity. 
Another concern that appears to have motivated Congress is the possibility 
that U.S.  firms would move their R&D operations to offshore locations that 
offered more attractive tax or regulatory environments. Of course, few low- 
tax foreign locations offer the scientific infrastructure and proximity to impor- 
tant markets available in the United States. Nevertheless, U.S. firms perform 
some of their R&D offshore, and it was feared that the foreign share of R&D 
performed by  American companies would rise in the  1980s along with the 
general trend to globalize U.S. business. 
The prediction proved false. The foreign share of R&D performed by U.S. 
companies, which has never been very large, remained small throughout the 
1980s despite the rapid growth of  foreign sales by  U.S.  firms. Figure 5.1 
illustrates this  att tern.^ In 1974, R&D performed abroad by  foreign affiliates 
equaled 8.1 percent of the total foreign and domestic R&D expenditures of 
3. The data on which fig. 5.1 is based come from a National Science Foundation (1991) survey 
of virtually all firms  in the United States with annual R&D expenditures of  $1 million or more. 
The survey is directed at R&D performed in the United States and, partly for that reason, has a 
somewhat disappointing response rate to its questions about R&D performed by foreign affiliates. 
There are other omissions as well. Cohen and Levin (1989) note that R&D reported in Compustat 
files is  12 percent higher than R&D reported  in the NSF survey, and there is a view that the 
Compustat figures are the more reliable ones. Nevertheless, the NSF surveys cover the foreign 
R&D undertaken by the largest firms and appear to capture the important aggregate trends in R&D 
activity. 152  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.1  R&D Expenditure as a Percentage of GNP  1961-1987 
West  United  United 

































































































































































Source: National Science Board (1989) 
Nore: French data are based on gross domestic product (GNP); consequently, percentages may 
be slightly overstated, compared to GNP. Omissions (-)  indicate that R&D data are unavilable. 
U.S.  firms. This ratio grew to 9.7 percent by  1979 but fell steadily to 7.2 
percent in  1982 and 6.0 percent in  1985. After  1985, the foreign share of 
R&D rose somewhat but was only 8.5 percent by  1989. U.S. firms chose not 
to move their R&D operations out of the country en masse in the 1980s. 
It would be possible to infer from figure 5.1 that tax policy was partly re- 
sponsible for the movement in the foreign share of R&D undertaken by U.S. 
companies. The foreign share fell at about the same time that Congress made 
R&D in the United States more attractive from a tax standpoint, and it rose 
again after 1986, when some of the tax benefits for R&D in the United States 
were removed. But foreign exchange rate movements may represent a more 
compelling explanation of much of the pattern visible in figure 5.1. Using a 
trade-weighted foreign exchange rate index to measure all foreign and domes- 
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Fig. 5.2  Foreign affiliate R&D share, based on real exchange rate 154  James R. Hines, Jr. 
1974 as the numeraire) foreign to total R&D expenditures. Over the period 
1974-89,  there is very little movement in this ratio from the 8.1 percent value 
it took in 1974. 
U.S. tax policy may very well have influenced the foreign R&D activities 
of U.S. firms over the 1974-89  time period but could have done so in ways 
that were just offset by foreign market conditions (or, for that matter, foreign 
tax changes). Nevertheless, it is clear from the relative magnitudes involved 
that U.S. government policy reforms such as those enacted in 1981 and 1986 
are likely to induce greater changes in R&D performed by U.S. firms in the 
United States than in their R&D performed abroad. In order to understand 
how  the incentives U.S. firms face have changed over time, it is helpful to 
consider the U.  S. system of taxing multinational corporations. 
5.2  R&D and the Law 
This section reviews the tax treatment of R&D by U.S. corporations, with 
particular emphasis on the tax treatment of firms with international income. 
5.2.1  General Treatment of R&D 
Expenditures on research and development by firms in the United States are 
deductible for income tax  purpose^.^ Because a firm’s stock of R&D usually 
has the character of a capital good, in that it generates revenues both currently 
and over a number of future years, immediate expensing of R&D is an attrac- 
tive tax feat~re.~  By contrast, physical capital such as plant and equipment is 
depreciated for tax purposes and, despite occasional inducements such as the 
investment tax credit, has always been tax-disfavored relative to R~LD.~  Gen- 
erally speaking, the effective rate of  tax on R&D is zero, because firms will 
choose  R&D expenditures  that  equate the  (after-tax) marginal  product of 
R&D to the (after-tax) cost of R&D. Because the same tax rate applies to both 
the marginal product of R&D and the marginal cost, the tax rate should not 
influence the level of R&D. 
The research and experimentation (R&E) credit was introduced in  1981 to 
4. An exception is that expenditures for the acquisition or improvement of depreciable property, 
or land, used in conjunction with research are not deductible. Assets other than  land can be depre- 
ciated for tax purposes at rapid rates. For example, the Tax Reform Act of  1986 classifies equip- 
ment used for research as five-year recovery property. Special rules apply to certain industries. 
5. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1982) find that the profitability of the firms in their sample appeared 
to be influenced by R&D expenditures lagged four to six years. Griliches and Mairesse (1984) 
estimate firm productivity to be a function of  the stock of accumulated R&D capital, which they 
take to depreciate at a rate of  15 percent per year.  In their study of patent renewals, Pakes and 
Schankerman (1984b) find evidence of  a somewhat higher depreciation rate for R&D capital, 25 
percent per year, but one that is much below the 100 percent rate that is implied in the tax law. 
6. See Auerbach (1983) for a historical survey of the effective tax rates on investments in plant 
and equipment. The relative attractiveness of the immediate expensing of R&D expenditures is 
the basis of  Fullerton  and Lyon’s (1988) estimates of the efficiency cost of  “excessive” R&D 
(relative to investments in tangible capital) in the United States. 155  On  the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
stimulate additional R&D activity in the United States.’ The R&E credit ini- 
tially offered a 25 percent tax credit for R&D expenditures above a base level 
determined by  the average of a firm’s previous three years’ worth of  R&D 
expenditures. The idea behind the design of the credit was to offer an incentive 
for marginal research activities, but one that did not subsidize inframarginal 
research. Of course, in practice, matters are not so simple, and the R&E credit 
can often have the perverse effect of discouraging research and development 
or of providing only trivial incentives to undertake marginal R&D, because 
by  undertaking additional R&D activities today a firm may reduce the credit 
it would otherwise receive in future years. Furthermore, various limits built 
into the credit reduce the incentive it provides in certain cases.8 
The R&E credit came under fire from various arguments that implied that it 
was not a cost-effective way of stimulating R&zD.~  Partly in response, the Tax 
Reform Act of  1986 reduced the R&E credit to 20 percent and tightened some 
of  the definitions of R&D eligible for the credit. The  1988 tax act further 
reduced the subsidy afforded by the R&E credit by  making half of the credit 
amount taxable income,  and the  1989 tax act made the credit amount  100 
percent taxable. In addition, the 1989 act changed the way that the base was 
calculated, so that, starting in 1990, additional R&D expenditure in one year 
does not reduce a firm’s tax credit in subsequent years. The R&E tax credit 
limped through the  1980s on the basis of  temporary  extensions (in  1986, 
1988, 1989, and 1990) that may have strengthened its impact by introducing 
uncertainty about whether any credit at all would be available in the future, 
but the credit seems unlikely to have had an important effect on overall R&D 
activities. More important for the present study, the R&E credit was available 
to all firms without regard to their foreign activities (indeed, offshore R&D 
was  ineligible for the credit). In order to analyze those tax changes in the 
1980s that  did  influence firms on  the  basis  of  their  foreign  activities,  it 
is necessary to consider some of  the international features of  the U.S.  tax 
system.  lo 
7. There are some small distinctions between activities that qualify for the R&E credit and 
R&D that is deductible but must be allocated according to 51.861-8. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 
tightened the definition of R&D that is eligible for the tax credit. 
8. For example, R&D expenditures in excess of 200 percent of the base amount are eligible 
for only half the credit rate, even though they raise the base for future years. Furthermore, firms 
must have taxable profits (or the potential to carry credits forward or back against taxable profits) 
to benefit from the credit. See Eisner, Albert, and Sullivan (1984) and Altshuler (1988) for analy- 
ses of the effective rates of  subsidy provided by  the R&E credit.  Eisner, Albert, and Sullivan 
estimate the average effective credit rate for 1981 to be zero and for 1982 to be 4 percent. Altshu- 
ler, using a slightly different methodology, finds the effective credit rate for 1981 to be between  1 
percent and 2 percent. 
9. See, for example, Mansfield (1986), who argues that the R&E credit had only a very small 
effect on R&D in the United States and that it reduced tax collections by an amount equal to three 
times the additional R&D it generated.  Wozny (1989) and the U.S.  General Accounting Office 
(1989) report similar findings for a GAO-conducted study of  the R&E credit. 
10. Parts of the following brief description of the tax system are excerpted from Hines (1990). 156  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
5.2.2  U.S. Taxation of Foreign Income 
The United States taxes income on a “residence” basis, meaning that U.S. 
corporations and individuals owe taxes to the U.S. government on all of their 
worldwide income, whether earned in the United States or not. Because for- 
eign profits are usually taxed in host countries, U.S. law provides a foreign 
tax credit for income taxes (and related taxes) paid to foreign governments, in 
order not to subject U.S. multinationals to double taxation. With the foreign 
tax credit, a U.S. corporation that earns $100 in a foreign country with a 12 
percent tax rate (and a foreign tax obligation of $12) pays only $22 to the U.S. 
government, because its U.S. corporate tax liability of  $34 (34 percent of 
$100) is reduced to $22 by the foreign tax credit of $12. The foreign tax credit 
is, however, limited to U.S. tax liability on foreign income. If, in the example, 
the foreign tax rate were 50 percent, then the firm pays $50 to the foreign 
government, but its U.S.  foreign tax credit is limited to $34. Hence, a U.S. 
firm receives full tax credits for its foreign taxes paid only when it is in a 
“deficit credit” position-that  is, when its average foreign tax rate is less than 
its tax rate on domestic operations. A firm has “excess credits” if its available 
foreign tax credits exceed U.S.  tax liability on its foreign income.”  Firms 
average together their taxable incomes and taxes paid in all of their foreign 
operations in calculating their foreign tax credits and the foreign tax credit 
limit. 
Deferral of  U.S.  taxation of  certain foreign earnings is another important 
feature of the U.S. international tax system. A U.S. parent firm is taxed on its 
subsidiaries’ foreign income only when that income is returned (“repatriated”) 
to the parent corporation. This type of  deferral is available only to foreign 
operations that are separately incorporated in foreign countries (“subsidiaries” 
of the parent) and not to consolidated (“branch”) operations. The U.S. govern- 
ment taxes branch profits as they are earned, just as it would profits earned 
within the United States. 
The deferral of  U.S. taxation may create incentives for firms with lightly 
taxed foreign earnings to delay repatriating dividends from their foreign sub- 
sidiaries.lz This incentive arises in those cases in which firms expect never to 
repatriate their foreign earnings or anticipate that future years will be more 
1  1.  Furthermore, income  is broken  into different functional “baskets” in  the calculation of 
applicable credits and limits. In order to qualify for the foreign tax credit, firms must own at least 
10 percent of  a foreign affiliate, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable. 
12. The incentive to defer repatriation of  lightly taxed subsidiary earnings is attenuated by the 
Subpart F provisions,  introduced in U.S.  law in 1962, that treat a subsidiary’s passive income, 
and income invested in U.S. property, as if it were distributed to its U.S. owners, thereby subject- 
ing it to immediate U.S. taxation. The Subpart F rules apply to controlled foreign corporations, 
which are foreign corporations owned at least 50 percent by U.S.  persons holding stakes of at 
least 10 percent each. Controlled foreign corporations that reinvest their foreign earnings in active 
businesses can continue to defer their U.S. tax liability on these earnings. See Hines and Rice 
(1990)  and Scholes and Wolfson (1991)  for the behavioral implications of these rules. 157  On the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax  Changes 
attractive for repatriation (either because domestic tax rates will be lower or 
because future sources of  foreign income will  generate excess foreign tax 
credits that can be used to offset U.S. tax liability on the dividends).I3  It ap- 
pears that, in practice, U.S. multinationals choose their dividend repatriations 
selectively, and they generally pay dividends out of their more heavily taxed 
foreign earnings first.  l4 Consequently, the average tax rate that firms face on 
their foreign income need not exactly equal the average foreign tax rate faced 
by their branches and subsidiaries abroad. 
Branch earnings and dividends from subsidiaries represent only two forms 
of foreign income for U.S. income tax purposes. Interest received from for- 
eign sources also represents foreign income, although foreign interest receipts 
are often classified within their own basket and hence are not averaged with 
other income in calculating the foreign tax credit. Royalty income received 
from foreigners, including foreign affiliates of  U.S.  firms, is also foreign- 
source income. Foreign governments often impose moderate taxes on divi- 
dend, interest, and royalty payments from foreign affiliates to their U.S. par- 
ent companies; these withholding taxes are fully creditable against a U.S. tax- 
payer’s U.S. tax liability on foreign income. 
5.2.3  Interaction of R&D and Foreign Income Rules 
U.S. firms with foreign income are generally not permitted to deduct all of 
their R&D expenditures in the United States against their domestic taxable 
incomes. Instead, the law provides for various methods of allocating R&D 
expenses between domestic and foreign income. The intention of the law is to 
retain the relatively generous treatment of R&D, but only for that part of  a 
firm’s R&D expenditures that is devoted to production for domestic markets. 
R&D-performing firms with foreign sales and foreign income are presumed 
to be doing at least some of their R&D to enhance their foreign profitability. 
From the standpoint of  taxpaying firms, the U.S. tax law’s distinction be- 
tween domestic and foreign R&D deductions is potentially quite important. If 
an R&D expense is deemed to be domestic, then it is deductible against the 
taxpayer’s U.S. taxable income. Alternatively, if  it is deemed to be foreign, 
then the R&D expense reduces foreign taxable income for the purposes of 
US.  income taxation only. Foreign governments do not use U.S. methods of 
calculating R&D deductions and generally do not permit U.S. firms to reduce 
their taxable incomes in foreign countries on the basis of R&D undertaken in 
the United States. Consequently, an R&D expense deduction allocated against 
foreign income is valuable to a U.S. firm only if  it has deficit foreign tax 
credits. If  it does have deficit credits, then some of the firm’s foreign income 
is subject to U.S. tax, and any additional dollar of  R&D deduction allocated 
13. The deferral of U.S.  tax liability does not itself create an incentive to delay paying dividends 
14. See the evidence presented in Hines and Hubbard (1990). 
from foreign subsidiaries, because the U.S. tax must be paid eventually. See Hartman (1985). 158  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
against foreign income reduces the firm’s U.S. taxable income by a d~llar.’~ 
With deficit credits, firms are indifferent between allocating R&D expenses 
against foreign income and allocating it against domestic income.I6 If, on the 
other hand, firms have excess foreign tax credits, then R&D expense allocated 
against foreign income does them no good, since foreign income generates no 
U.S. tax liability anyway. 
The tax law governing the allocation of R&D expenses was for years rather 
vague but was codified by  U.S.  Treasury regulation §1.861-8 in  1977. The 
1977 rules provide for several stages in allocating R&D expenditures for tax 
purposes. R&D in the U.S. that is undertaken to meet certain legal require- 
ments (such as R&D devoted to meeting pollution standards) can be 100 per- 
cent allocated against domestic income. Firms that perform more than half of 
their (other than legally required) R&D in the United States are permitted to 
allocate 30 percent of that R&D against U.S. income. The remaining 70 per- 
cent is then to be allocated between domestic and foreign sources on the basis 
of sales (including the sales of controlled foreign corporations). R&D is gen- 
erally allocated according to activities within product lines (defined similarly 
to two-digit SIC codes),  so that  a corporation need not allocate part of  its 
chemical R&D against foreign income simply because the electronics part of 
its business has foreign sales. 
There are several options available to taxpayers who are unsatisfied with the 
outcome of the R&D allocation method just described. Firms are permitted to 
apportion more than 30 percent of their domestic R&D against U.S. income if 
they can establish that it is reasonable to expect the R&D so apportioned to 
have very limited application outside of the country; the remaining portion of 
the R&D expenses are then allocated on the basis of sales. Alternatively, firms 
are permitted to allocate their R&D on the basis of total foreign and domestic 
income (though without the 30 percent initial allocation to U.S. source) so 
that firms with foreign operations that generate sales but not income (relative 
to domestic operations) might prefer the income allocation method. There is, 
however, a limit to the income allocation method: firms are not permitted to 
reduce their R&D allocation to foreign source to less than 50 percent of  the 
allocation that would have been produced by the sales method (including the 
30 percent initial apportionment). 
The Economic Recovery Act in  1981 changed these rules by  permitting 
U.S.  firms to  allocate  100  percent of  their R&D  performed in the United 
States against U.S. income. This change was intended to be temporary (two 
years) in order to offer strong R&D incentives while affording Congress the 
15. Curiously, the law is written so that the additional dollar of R&D deduction reduces taxable 
income without reducing the foreign tax credits available for foreign income taxes paid. 
16. This statement, along with much of the analysis described in the paper, abstracts from the 
ability of firms to  carry excess foreign tax credits backward two years and forward five years. 
Firms that can exploit carryforwards or carrybacks may (depending on specific circumstances) 
face incentives that are intermediate between those of deficit credit and excess credit firms. 159  On the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax  Changes 
opportunity to rethink its R&D policy. At the end of  that time, the U.S. De- 
partment of  the Treasury  (1983) produced a study concluding that the tax 
change offered a small R&D incentive to U.S. firms and was desirable on that 
basis.”  In 1984 and 1985, Congress extended the temporary change permit- 
ting 100 percent deductibility of U.S. R&D expenses against U.S. income, so 
these rules remained in place until the end of the 1986 tax year. 
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 removed the 100 percent deductibility of U.S. 
R&D expenses, replacing it with a new, and again temporary, system of R&D 
expense allocation.’8 Under the act, 50 percent of U.S. R&D expenses (other 
than for R&D to meet regulations, which were  100 percent allocated to do- 
mestic source) were allocated to domestic source, with the remaining 50 per- 
cent allocated on the basis of  sales or of  income, at the taxpayer’s choice. 
There was no limit imposed on the degree to which allocation on the basis of 
gross income could reduce foreign allocation relative to the sales method. 
These rules, it turned out, were in effect only for 1987. 
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of  1988 greatly complicates 
the analyst’s task of understanding the incentives to undertake R&D in 1988. 
For the first four months of the year, firms were permitted to allocate 64 per- 
cent of U.S. R&D expenses against U.S. domestic income, with the remain- 
ing 36 percent allocated between foreign and domestic sources on the basis of 
either sales or income (at the taxpayer’s choice). The 1988 act further provides 
that if  the 36 percent were allocated on the basis of  income, then the R&D 
allocation against foreign income must equal at least 30 percent of the foreign 
allocation that would have been produced by  the sales method. For the re- 
maining eight months of the year, taxpayers were required to use the alloca- 
tion method set forth in 51.861-8 as of  1977 (and described above). 
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1989 again changed the R&D 
allocation rules, this time reintroducing the same rules that applied for the 
first four months of 1988. A temporary extension in 1990 extended this treat- 
ment of  R&D through  1991. Consequently, 64 percent of  domestically per- 
formed R&D in 1989-91  can be allocated against domestic income, with the 
remaining 36  percent  allocated on  the  basis  either of  sales or of  income 
(though income allocation to foreign source must not be less than 30 percent 
of what the sales allocation would have been). 
It would be  difficult not to conclude from this brief  history of  the R&D 
17. The Treasury study based its conclusions on a range of assumed elasticities of R&D with 
respect to  price changes; there was no attempt made to ascertain how firms responded to the 
changes introduced in 1981. The study is a very careful analysis of firm-level tax return data and 
the  significant issues involved in the  51.861-8 change. On  the other hand, the study uses the 
average price reduction introduced by the 1981 tax law change, rather than the changes in mar- 
ginal prices of R&D and other inputs, to estimate the effects of the law. 
18. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 also introduced a number of other changes relevant to R&D 
investment decisions, including reducing the statutory corporate tax rate from 46 percent (the rate 
from 1979 to  1986) to 40  percent in 1987 and 34 percent for 1988 and subsequent years. The 1986 
act also removed a number of investment incentives such as accelerated depreciation of capital 
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expense allocation rules that they are intricate, confusing, and subject to fre- 
quent changes. For the purpose of analyzing the effects of legislative changes, 
however, we can discern a clear pattern. All U.S. firms could deduct their 
R&D expenses against domestic income from 1981 to 1986. Starting in 1987, 
multinational firms with excess foreign tax credits have been able to use only 
some of their R&D deductions, because part is allocated against foreign in- 
come (and thereby does not reduce their overall tax liabilities). For firms with 
deficit foreign tax credits, however, the period since 1987 is just as attractive 
as 1981-86;  even though some of their R&D expenses are allocated against 
foreign income, this foreign allocation reduces their U.S. tax liabilities by just 
as much as would an allocation against domestic income. 
5.3  Some Curious Incentives 
The incentives built into current and proposed tax treatments of  R&D are 
rather complicated and require some elaboration. In this section, in order to 
simplify matters, I focus on the allocation rules governing R&D (91.861-8 
and its temporary modifications)  and not on the R&E credit. 
It is helpful to separate the research activities of  multinationals into three 
types in order to isolate the incentives for each. The first type is R&D per- 
formed in the U.S. that generates only domestic sales and income. The second 
type is R&D undertaken in  the U.S. that generates only foreign sales and 
income. The third type is the offshore R&D activities of U.S. multinationals. 
There is no doubt that this separation is somewhat artificial in that the same 
R&D project often generates both foreign and domestic income; for that mat- 
ter, firms frequently undertake R&D without complete knowledge of  what 
kind of  output will result, much less whether the ensuing sales will occur in 
the  United  States or  abroad.  Nevertheless, the  incentives  for  each  type 
of R&D can differ significantly, and it clarifies the analysis to divide projects 
this way. 
5.3.1 
The first type of R&D is a major source of  concern among critics of  the 
5 1.861-8 system of allocation. The fear is that by allocating a fraction of new 
R&D expenditures against foreign income, the law may discourage domestic 
R&D intended for domestic markets. 
To  evaluate this argument, consider the behavior of  a profit-maximizing 
firm with domestic sales that are a function of its variable inputs (I)  and its 
R&D expenditures devoted to products sold domestically (R). For the time 
being, consider the case in which this domestic R&D does not influence the 
firm’s foreign profitability and in which domestic sales are unaffected by  for- 
eign R&D. Let Rf  denote the domestic R&D that the firm undertakes to gen- 
erate  foreign  sales  and  the  firm’s  total  domestic  R&D  (so  that 
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R  + R,  = B).  The domestic sales function is S(R, Z).  The firm’s after-tax 
profits from its domestic operations equal  I9 
(1)  [S(R, r) -  Z -  R -  ITRT/(~  -  T)]  (1 -  T) , 
in which T  is the domestic tax rate facing the firm and IT represents the fraction 
of the firm’s domestic R&D expenditures that is not deductible against domes- 
tic taxes. If the firm has deficit foreign tax credits, then IT  = 0 under the tax 
systems in effect during the 1980s. Suppose instead that the firm has excess 
foreign tax credits, and let (1 - a)  denote the fraction of  a firm’s R&D that 
is immediately allocated against domestic income, with the remaining a  allo- 
cated on the basis of domestic and foreign sales. Denote foreign sales by S*. 
Then IT  = aS*/(S + S*). The firm’s first-order condition that corresponds to 
maximizing equation (1) over the choice of R is 
(2)  as/aR - 1 -  mT/(1 -  7) -  (aIT/aR)BT/(i -  7)  = o . 
The corresponding first-order condition for the choice of Z  is 
(3)  asiaz - 1 -  (aT/aogT/(i -  T) = o . 
And the derivatives of the allocation function (IT) are 
(4)  aT/aR = -  a(as/aR)s*/(s + s*)2 
(5)  aIT/az = -  a(as/ar)s*/(s  + s*)* 
and 
Combining (2) and (4) yields 
in  which PR is the after-tax cost of  domestic R&D.  Equations (3) and (5) 
together yield 
19. The distinction between the domestic and foreign source of  profits is somewhat arbitrary, 
because the output of an R&D project may contribute to domestic and foreign profits and even the 
firms undertaking the R&D project might not know in advance whether domestic or foreign mar- 
kets will be more suitable for the product ultimately produced. Nevertheless, the tax incentives 
for the two types of projects differ significantly,  and if firms are able to estimate the likely location 
of the future sales generated by their R&D, then R&D should be sensitive to this difference. As a 
more minor matter, it is not quite correct to describe the profit-maximizing  choice of R by  differ- 
entiating (l), since R also affects (through its impact on s) the allocation (P)  of deductions for R, 
(because the same P applies to both R and R,).  This complication is the reason that E,  rather than 
R, appears in (2), (3), (6), (71, (9), (lo), (W,  and (14). 162  James R. Hines, Jr. 
There are two notable features of the first-order conditions (6) and (7). The 
first is that the marginal product of R&D, which equals the right side of (6), 
exceeds one as long as the ratio E/(S + S*) is less than one. This value re- 
flects the direct effect of the allocation rule in discouraging domestic R&D by 
permitting only a fraction of  it to be deducted against domestic taxable in- 
come. As a consequence, the required return on a dollar of marginal R&D is 
higher than it would be in the absence of taxation. 
The second feature of equations (6) and (7) is that the marginal product of 
variable inputs other than R&D-PI  in equation (7)-is  always less than one. 
The reason is that the R&D  allocation rule encourages the use of  ordinary 
domestic inputs to generate domestic sales, since greater domestic sales per- 
mit a higher fraction of the firm’s inframarginal R&D to be allocated against 
domestic income. This effect is greater, the larger is &/(S + S*). In practice, 
&/(S  + S*) takes a value of something like 4 percent. 
It is likely that this second effect-the  subsidy to ordinary domestic in- 
puts-encourages  domestic R&D and has such an impact that it partly undoes 
the first, more direct, effect on the level of R&D. The reason is that ordinary 
inputs and R&D are likely to be complementary in the firm’s production func- 
tion, so that a subsidy to one indirectly encourages the use of the other. The 
subsidy to ordinary inputs operates through the level of inframarginal R&D, 
while the direct tax on R&D operates through its effect on the marginal prod- 
uct of R&D. The more R&D-intensive a firm’s operations are, the more of an 
incentive the firm faces to expand its domestic operations in order to allocate 
a high fraction of that R&D against domestic taxable income. If the firms with 
greater R&D intensity are also those firms with the most total R&D, then the 
tax rules might have the effect of not discouraging R&D to the degree that a 
simple calculation based on the fraction deductible might suggest.*O 
5.3.2  Domestic R&D for Foreign Markets 
The  analysis so far has addressed the incentives to undertake domestic 
R&D intended to stimulate sales in domestic markets. Of course, part of  the 
premise of  31.861-8 and other legislation is that multinational firms doing 
R&D in the United States are able to use the fruits of that R&D to stimulate 
the profitability of  their foreign business operations. This section considers 
the incentives created by the allocation rules in such a case. 
20. A third feature of (6) and (7) is that the marginal products of R&D and of other inputs are 
endogenously determined, since E and S are elements of (6) and (7). As a consequence, it is not 
correct to treat PR and PI as exogenous tax prices of R&D and other inputs unless instruments are 
available for E and S. The difficulty is that an hypothesized linear relationship between R and PR 
becomes nonlinear once it is acknowledged that PR is a function of R. The small magnitude of Rl 
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Let S*(R,, I*)  denote the firm's foreign sales function, in which R, repre- 
sents domestic R&D performed to stimulate foreign sales and I* represents 
ordinary  foreign  inputs.  Suppose  that  the  firm  operates  its  foreign  sales 
through foreign subsidiaries that are required to remit to their U.S. parent 
firms royalties equal to the value of the R&D that generates their sales. If the 
royalties are calculated on the basis of arm's-length prices, as U.S. and almost 
all foreign laws provide,21  then the subsidiary should retain, after royalties, 
just enough of its sales revenue to cover the cost of its expenditures on I*.  All 
of the profits on foreign sales are returned as royalties and are subject to with- 
holding taxes imposed at rate w*  by the foreign country. If the U.S. firm has 
excess foreign tax credits, then this withholding tax is the only tax it pays on 
the profits generated by its foreign sales. If, instead, the firm has deficit for- 
eign tax credits, then the royalties generate a tax liability to the U.S. govern- 
ment (and the withholding taxes generate a foreign tax credit), so foreign prof- 
its are effectively taxed at the domestic tax rate. In the case of  a firm with 
excess foreign tax credits, its objective is to maximizez2 
(8)  {[S*(Rf,  I*) -  I*](l -  w*)}  -  (1 -  7)Rf -  TR~T  . 
The firm's first-order condition over the choice of Rf is 
(9)  (1 -  w*)as*/aRf -  (1 -  T  + TT) - (an/aR,)ET = o , 
and the corresponding first-order condition over the choice of I* is 
(10)  (1 -  w*)(as*/az* - 1) - (aT/aI*)gT = 0. 
R&D deductions are allocated in the same way  for R, as they are for R, so 
T = aS*/(S + S*), and the derivatives of the allocation function are 
21. Of the twenty-five industrialized countries surveyed by Lawlor (1985), twenty-four applied 
to  the  arm's length principle to  the taxation  of related-party transactions; Hong Kong was the 
exception. 
22. If, instead, the firm has deficit foreign tax credits, then expression (8) must be modified by 
setting T = 0 and w*  = T.  It is then straightforward to  show that, with deficit foreign tax credits, 
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in which PR is the after-tax cost of domestic R&D. Equations (10) and (12) 
together imply 
1 - w* 
-  -  -  = PI*  dS* 
T&S 
(S + S*)2 
1-w*- 
aI* 
There are several differences between the tax-induced incentives to under- 
take domestic R&D generating foreign sales-as  revealed by (1  3) and (14)- 
and those for domestic R&D directed at domestic sales. The term w* in the 
denominator of (1  3) reflects the extremely generous treatment of royalty ex- 
ports by U.S. firms with excess foreign tax credits. Royalty income is consid- 
ered to have foreign source under U.S. law. Hence, if a U.S. firm has excess 
foreign tax credits, it can use the credits to eliminate its U.S. tax liability on 
the royalty income. As a result, the firm is subject only to whatever withhold- 
ing taxes are imposed by foreign governments on royalties paid to the United 
States.  At the same time, the firm can deduct a considerable fraction of its 
U.S. R&D expenditures against its taxable U.S. income. 
In practice,  the withholding tax rates applied to royalties remitted to U.S. 
firms are, on average, very low. Table 5.2 lists the withholding rates charged 
by twenty-one other major countries on royalty payments to the U.S. in 1990. 
Many of  these countries  do not impose any withholding tax  at all, and the 
average withholding tax rate, calculated using weights based on 1984 royal- 
ties, is 4.9  percent. 
Domestic R&D directed at foreign markets is therefore very lightly taxed 
but is not favorably treated by the R&D expense allocation rules after 1986. 
The allocation rules are responsible for the third term in the numerator of (13), 
which increases the numerator, and the third term in the denominator of (  13), 
which decreases the denominator, relative to a system of 100 percent domestic 
deductibility.  Consequently, the required marginal product of domestic R&D 
for foreign  markets  is higher than  it would  be under  100 percent domestic 
allocation. Similarly, the system of less than 100 percent domestic deductibil- 
ity reduces the denominator of (14), raising the required before-tax  marginal 
product of  ordinary foreign inputs for the same  As a result, for firms 
with excess foreign  tax credits,  the tax  law  after  1986 can be  expected  to 
discourage R&D directed at foreign markets,  relative to the incentives those 
firms enjoyed prior to 1986. It is interesting to note, however, that after 1986 
domestic R&D directed at foreign markets may still be subsidized by the U.S. 
23. Equation (14)  indicates that foreign inputs have required marginal products that exceed one, 
since the foreign sales they generate raise TI and thereby reduce domestic R&D tax deductions. 
The firm forgoes some foreign profits in order to keep TI down. The specification of (8) assumes 
that in losing foreign profits the firm also reduces the royalty it must pay; if, instead, the royalty 
is set by the amount that an unaffiliated firm (with the same production function) would pay to 
exploit R,,  then the firm’s maximand will change slightly, and (14) will appear with T*  in place of 
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Table 5.2  Withholding Tax Rates on Royalties Paid to the United States 
Country 
1984 Royalties 
1990 Tax Rate  ($ millions) 
Argentina  36%  $  68.3 
Australia  10  297.6 
Austria  0  48.  I 
Be  1  g  i  u  m  0  170.9 
Brazil  0  56.6 
Canada  10  818.1 
Finland  5  50.0 
France  5  642.0 
Germany  0  722.2 
Hong Kong  0  42.5 
Ireland  0  46.1 
Italy  10  372.5 
Japan  10  1,213.8 
Korea  15  48.4 
Netherlands  0  326.4 
New Zealand  10  42.3 
Norway  0  1,236.4 
Spain  10  108.9 
Switzerland  0  138.0 
United Kingdom  0  1,022.6 
Singapore  31  49.9 
Sources: Price Waterhouse (1991); Mose (1989/1990). 
tax system even for excess credit firms, since (13) is likely to take a value well 
below one (though [  141 will exceed one). 
Foreign R&D by U.S. Firms 
There remains the issue of R&D performed by U.S. firms in foreign coun- 
tries. R&D preformed abroad is generally subject to foreign tax rules (as well 
as U. S.  rules for purposes of U.S. income taxation). Because foreign tax rates 
and tax rules pertaining to R&D were changing at the same time that U.S. law 
changed, it is difficult to summarize even the direction taken by the incentives 
for U.S. firms to do R&D offshore. To make matters worse, firm-level data on 
R&D performed abroad are not available. Consequently, the remainder of this 
study avoids specific consideration of the incentives U.S. firms have to under- 
take R&D abroad,  noting that aggregate offshore R&D is small relative to 
domestic R&D and taking as a working assumption that foreign R&D grows 
at a steady rate that is unaffected by events in the United States. 
5.4  Behavior of U.S. Firms 
This section evaluates the responses of U.S. firms to changes in the R&D 
allocation rules over the period  1984-89,  using the framework sketched in 
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5.4.1  Incentives 
In order to determine how firms responded to the tax changes after 1986, it 
is helpful to outline a simple structure for their production relationships. Con- 
sider a firm  i with  a production function that  generates sales as a Cobb- 
Douglas function of  its R&D and ordinary inputs (including labor and capi- 
tal). Such a function looks thus: 
in which +, is a parameter common to all firms in period t,  +i  is a fixed effect 
for firm i, and uit is a normally distributed error term. Differentiating (15) with 
respect to R and I and imposing (6) and (7) yields 
(16)  ln(Rit) = (1 - P - Y)-’  [+I  + 9i  (1 - P)ln(’Y) 
pln(p) - (1 - p,)ln(PR) - p,ln(PI) + u,]  . 
Equation (16) indicates that the level of R&D a firm will choose is a nega- 
tive function of  the tax price of R&D and a negative function of  the tax price 
of  other  The relative magnitude of  the effects of  these two prices 
depends on the size of  p, which reflects the contribution of inputs other than 
R&D to firm sales. Griliches (1986) estimates a cross-sectional relationship 
for the years  1967,  1972, and  1977 in which firm value added is a Cobb- 
Douglas function of inputs including R&D, finding the share of other inputs, 
p in (16), to range between 0.8 and 0.9. Jaffe (1988) obtains similar results 
with sales on the left side and using within-firm changes in inputs from 1972 
to 1977 to estimate production parameters (including technological spillovers 
from other firms as an input). Given that the relationship in (15) is specified 
in terms of sales and not value added, one might expect the relative difference 
between the coefficients on PR and PI  to be on the high side of this range, 
around 1  :9.  25 
24. As  written, equation (16) expresses the demand for R&D as a function of tax prices (PR 
and PI)  only. It is also true that movements in the real market prices of inputs and outputs should 
be expected to influence a firm’s desired R&D. Relative prices of R&D inputs are notoriously 
difficult to measure (for an important attempt, see Mansfield, Romeo, and Switzer 1983), as are 
output prices.  If relative price movements are similar for all multinational firms, however, then 
this effect is likely to be captured by the year constant +,. 
25. In separate cross-sectional production function regressions (not elsewhere reported) on the 
subset of firms in my sample reporting total labor expenses (amounting to fifty-two firms in the 
1986 sample), the 1986 results were 
In(S + S*) =  1.39 +  0.28 In(CG) + 
(0.13)  (0.04) 
0.35 In(L)  +  0.28 In(PPE) + 
(0.06)  (0.05) 
0.07 ln(RD) R2  = 0.983 , 
(0.04) 
in which L is labor expense; PPE is book property, plant, and equipment; RD is the firm’s R&D 
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Suppose that the same firm i also generates its foreign  sales by a Cobb- 
Douglas function of  R&D devoted to foreign products and other foreign in- 
puts. Such a function looks like: 
(17) 
and when differentiated and combined with (13) and (14) it yields 
S*,,(Rfit,  I*J  = RfirY* I,,F*  exp(+*, + 4J*l  + u*,J  9 
(18)  In(Rfi,)  = (1 - P* -  ’Y*)-’[+*,  4-  $*, f (1 - F*)ln(’Y*) 
p,*ln(p,*) - (1 - p,*)ln(PR*) - p,*ln(PI*)  + u*,,l  . 
Unfortunately,  (16)  and (18) cannot be  estimated  directly,  because  even 
though R is observable it is not possible to observe its components R,  and Rfir 
separately. Taking antilogs of (16) and (1  8) and adding them does produce an 
equation specified in terms of observable variables but, in doing so, removes 
some of the attractive linearity of the system. An alternative approximation is 
available that maintains the linearity of the system for those cases in which R, 
is not too large relative  to R.  Assume that this is the case. Then, from the 
definition of &, 
(19) 
Taking logs and using a first-order Taylor approximation, 
(20) 
Taking period zero to be the base period in a short panel, the ratio on the right 
side of (20) can be written 
(21) 
II, = R,  + Rfi, = R,(1  + RfiJR,)  . 
In(R,J = In(R,,) + RfiJR,, 
R,JR,  = {Rfio[l + Wfi, -  Rfi0)~Rfi011@7,0[~  + (4, -  R,,)/R,I1  t 
and for small differences over time it becomes 
(22) 
Then, using the approximation that (R,, -  R,,)/R,  = ln(R,,) -  In(R,,)  ,  (22) 
becomes 
RfiJR,, = (R,dR,,)(l  + @/!, -  R/!,YRfi0 -  -  R,VR,O)  . 
(23)  RfiJR,,  (RfidR,J[I  + MRfiJ - WRfiJ -  WRJ  + MR,JI 
Combining (23) and (20), 
(24)  In(&,,) = 1 -  (RfidR,,) In(R,J  + (E/i0/RLO)  w$,)  + 8,  f 
in  which  8,  is  a  firm-specific  constant equal to (Rfio/Rto)  [l +  In(R,,)  - 
In(Rfio)].  Combining (24), (16), and (18) then yields 
included in the regression. Similar regressions on other years and with different specifications 
produced  similar results.  Although cross-sectional results  based  on accounting data should  be 
viewed skeptically (because firm-specific factors are obscured and the regression is subject to the 
problem noted by Schankerman [1981], that many of the R&D inputs are included among other 
right-side variables and consequently double counted), they suggest that it is not unreasonable to 
expect p, to take a value around 0.9. 168  James R. Hines, Jr. 
(25) 
in which ul  =  RfidR,,  is the ratio of foreign to domestic application of R&D in 
the base period, and additional information about production parameters im- 
plies further restrictions among the coefficients p, - p,.  The prices PR, PI, 
PR*, and PI* differ among firms and over years for the same firm; the values 
of the domestic prices PR and PI are equal to one over the 1981-86  period and 
for firms with deficit tax credits equal to one after 1986. The parameters A, 
and q,  are new combined year and individual effects, while the term 5, pre- 
multiplying u, reflects year-specific shocks that affect foreign and domestic 
markets differently. The equation (25) is then in a form that permits linear 
estimation of the responses of firms to the four (potentially) changing prices 
on its right side. 
The only  remaining difficulty in  estimating  (25) is  that  the term  u, = 
RfidR,, is unobservable, since firms do not report (and indeed might not be 
able to report if they wanted to) the fraction of their R&D devoted to foreign 
markets. On the other hand, each firm’s ratio of foreign to domestic sales is 
observable, and over the period  1981-86  should be unaffected by  the R&D 
allocation rules, since the rules were the same for all firms. Suppose that 
(26)  Rfid&  = p(S*,dS,,)  v i . 
Then it is possible to use values of (S*,dS,,)  from the 1981-86  period for vt on 
the right side of  (25) and to estimate the equation while simultaneously esti- 
mating the value of  p. One additional assumption is necessary in order to 
linearize this  estimation.  If  the foreign and domestic production  functions 
have the same production shares for R&D and other inputs, so that y  = y* 
and  p.  = p*, then from (16) and  (18) it should be the case that  p, = p, 
and p,  = p,  in (25). Imposing this restriction, using (26), and defining u, = 
(S*,dS,,),  equation (25) becomes 
(27) 
In this form of  the estimating equation, the ratios p,/p,  and p,/p,  are esti- 
mates of  p. 
5.4.2  The Data 
The analysis in this section uses a panel of firm-level data reported in Com- 
pustat over the period 1984-89.  As a special project initiated in 1984, Com- 
pustat culls from a subset of  its firms’ information on their foreign pretax 
earnings and foreign income taxes paid. Firms are not required to report the 
countries in which they earned their profits, nor are they required to indicate 
if profits were repatriated or reinvested abroad. In a sample of 2,800 firms, 
foreign earnings and tax data are available for approximately 500 firms for 
each of the reporting years. 
In(!!,)  = h, + q,  + E,v, + P,(1 - v,)ln(PR) + 
p,(1  - u,)ln(PI) + P,u,ln(PR*)  + p,u,ln(PZ*)  +  E,,  , 
In(&,,) = X,  + q,  + Ep, + P,ln(PR) + p,ln(PO  + 
P,u,[ln(PR*) - ln(PR)] + p,u,[ln(PI*) -  In(PI)] + E~,  . 169  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
Unfortunately, the main Compustat file does not include data on firms’ for- 
eign sales. In order to obtain foreign sales information, it was necessary to 
use the Compustat Geographic Segment File, which reports separate business 
segments for certain firms with major foreign operations. This file contains 
data on foreign sales of U.S. firms, though it offers little other detail on for- 
eign operations.26  In order to identify those firms that are likely to have excess 
foreign tax credits,  it is necessary to construct estimates of the foreign tax 
rates they face; this is possible only if firms report their foreign tax liabilities 
along with  their (positive) foreign incomes. Firms were excluded from the 
sample if they did not report their domestic and (positive) foreign income and 
sales,  along  with  their  R&D expenditures,  continuously  from  1984-89. 
Firms involved in major mergers-those  in which firm sales rose by 50 per- 
cent or more-were  also omitted.  These exclusions left  a sample of  116 
firms. 
These 116 firms were at least three times the size of average firms in Com- 
pustat, with U.S. federal tax liabilities in 1989 averaging $91.9 million (ver- 
sus $30.4 million for the Compustat average). In addition, the sample firms 
had average foreign tax liabilities of $121.9 million. Column 1 of table 5.3 is 
a list of some of the sample’s characteristics. 
In order to construct the tax prices firms face, it is necessary to establish 
whether or not they have excess foreign tax  credit^.^' Unfortunately, the only 
way  to do so precisely is to examine their U.S. federal income tax returns, 
which are confidentiaLZ8  Given the data at hand, it is necessary instead to treat 
each firm as though all of its foreign income were taxed at the same, average, 
rate, so that firms with average foreign tax rates above the U.S. statutory rate 
are considered to have excess foreign tax credits. This ignores the endogeneity 
of  a firm’s dividend repatriation decision and, perhaps more important, ig- 
nores the separation of some of  its foreign income into separate baskets for 
the purposes of  the foreign tax  credit calc~lation.~~  Column 2 of  table 5.3 
26. In particular,  the Geographic  Segment File does not indicate the magnitude of  a firm’s 
foreign R&D.  Information about sales and profits in individual foreign countries is available only 
sporadically. 
27. It is also necessary  to construct tax prices for firms that would prefer to use one of the 
alternatives to the sales allocation method. These prices were constructed and applied for those 
firms that would do better to use one of the alternative methods. 
28. Even with access to a firm’s income tax records, it is still difficult to identify its foreign tax 
credit status for purposes of estimation, because the magnitude of creditable foreign taxes claimed 
by the firm in part depends on its dividend repatriations and other discretionary choices that may 
be endogenous to the policies under study. By contrast, the average foreign tax rate the firm faces 
may be much closer to an exogenous variable for some firms. 
29. One way to correct for this problem would be to adjust a firm’s observed foreign tax rate 
downward in determining its excess credit status. A number of  the regressions reported in tables 
5.5-5.12  were run with foreign tax rates adjusted downward by  0.02 and 0.04, with virtually 
identical results to those in the tables. An alternative correction would be to adjust the foreign tax 
rates upward, because firms can choose the pattern of their dividend repatriations from foreign 
subsidiaries and, all other things equal, are more likely to repatriate dividends from locations with 
higher tax rates (as Hines and Hubbard [1990] find to be  the case for dividend repatriations by 
U.S. multinationals in 1984).  Even the post-1986 tightening of the basket definitions could justify 170  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.3  Characteristics of Subsamples in 1989 ($ millions) 
Sample  Nonmerging 
Characteristic  Whole Sample  Deficit FTC*  Firmst 
Mean sales in  1989  $6,280.6  $5,694.5  $6,036.8 
Percent foreign-source  35.4%  37.5%  37.8% 
Mean income in 1989  $569.5  $591.7  $598.0 
Percent foreign-source  57.2%  50.9%  67.3% 
Mean R&D expenditure  $259.3  $278.2  $310.0 
Number of firms  116  21  40 
*Firms having deficit foreign tax credits every year from 1987 to 1989. 




presents summary statistics of those firms that have deficit foreign tax credits 
continuously over the  1987-89  period.  They look quite similar to the  116 
firms in the main sample. 
Merger and acquisition activity represents another potential difficulty fac- 
ing the estimation of (27). The model is specified under the assumption that a 
firm’s characteristics are reasonably stable over a short time span. Firms that 
acquire other firms presumably absorb not only the acquired firm’s accumu- 
lated R&D stock and tax characteristics but also its firm-specific production 
function  characteristics.  The  changes  induced  by  mergers  may  introduce 
noise, if  not bias, into the estimation of  (27),30  so a separate sample of  40 
firms with no  merger activity at all over the  1984-89  period  was  created. 
Column 3 of  table  5.3  describes the properties of  the nonmerger sample, 
which is slightly more R&D-intensive than the sample of  116 firms but is 
otherwise similar. 
One final specification issue in estimating (27) is the choice of  left-side 
variable. Plausible cases could be made for including either R&D stock or 
R&D flow on the left side of this equation. The argument for estimating (27) 
on the stock of R&D rests on the appropriateness of  R&D stock as an argu- 
an upward adjustment in the sample’s foreign tax rate,  because certain low-tax foreign-income 
sources are segregated into their own basket. But, on net, important high-tax items with their own 
baskets-such  as oil income and high withholding tax interest income-make  a downward ad- 
justment more likely to capture the incentives firms face. 
30. The direction of potential bias is not clear. As a general matter, Hall (1988) finds no differ- 
ence between the mean growth rates of R&D intensity of firms involved in mergers and those not 
involved. Griliches and Mairesse (1984) find that firms with mergers produce significantly differ- 
ent panel estimates of productivity growth equations than do nonmerger firms; they argue on that 
basis that merger firms should not be excluded from productivity regressions. A successful merger 
increases the size of the acquiring firm, which might be expected to influence R&D intensity, 
though the evidence (Cohen, Levin,  and Mowery  1987) suggests that size alone has very little 
effect. 171  On  the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
ment of the sales function in (15). The difficulty with estimating (27) with the 
stock variable on the left side is that  stock adjustment costs are implicitly 
assumed to be equal to zero, so that desired equals actual stock in every year. 
Although the price changes-and  consequently the induced changes in de- 
sired stocks-are  small over this time period, it may be unreasonable to ex- 
pect immediate adjustment. Unfortunately, the time dimension in the panel 
does not permit reliable estimation of  adjustment costs. An alternative is to 
use current R&D expenditures as the argument of the sales function (15) and 
on the left side of the factor demand equation (27); this specification is some- 
what less compelling from the standpoint of the underlying production func- 
tion but is less subject to the problem of slow adjustment. Consequently, each 
specification of (27) was estimated twice, first with R&D stock as a dependent 
variable and second with R&D flow; the results were not greatly affected by 
the choice of dependent ~ariable.~’ 
Table 5.4 describes characteristics of the tax prices faced by subsets of firms 
in the sample over the 1987-89  period. The data suggest that there is consid- 
erable variation both  within and between industrial classifications (the first 
thirteen lines in the table present summaries by the most populated two-digit 
standard industrial classifications) in  the tax prices firms face. The last six 
lines of  the table exhibit average prices faced by  the whole sample of  116 
firms and the restricted sample of 38 nonmerging firms that is used in much 
of the estimation. For the average firm in the sample, the own-price of R&D 
[ln(PR)] increased  approximately  5  percent  in  response  to  the  1986 tax 
change.  For the  38 nonmerging firms, the average price rise was  slightly 
higher (5.5 percent).  These changes in own-prices of  R&D were offset by 
reductions in cross-prices of R&D [ln(PI)] that were on average 3-4  percent 
of the magnitude of  the own-price changes. While these cross-price move- 
ments  are  small,  examination of  (27) reveals that  small changes on these 
prices have considerable impact on R&D levels and partly attenuate the effects 
of the own-price changes during 1987-89. 
5.4.3  Their Behavior 
Table 5.5 presents estimates of  (27) for the sample of forty firms that did 
not exhibit merger activity over the 1984-89  period. The first two columns 
report the coefficients from the model in which R&D stock is the dependent 
variable, while columns 3 and 4 report results from regressions on R&D flow. 
Columns 1 and 3 present ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of  (27). As 
predicted, both domestic prices exert negative and significant effects on R&D 
activity, and the coefficient on the PI term is substantially larger (in absolute 
value) than the coefficient on the PR  term (though this coefficient is impre- 
3 1, R&D capital stocks were constructed using a perpetual inventory method, starting with 
R&D expenditures in 1975 (in constant  1984 dollars) and-following  Griliches and Mairesse 
(1984) and Jaffe (1986)-applying  a 15 percent rate of geometric decay to old stocks. 172  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.4  Characteristics  of Tax Prices, 1987-1989 
Number of  Standard 
Industry  Firms  Price  Mean  Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 






































In(PR)  0.0181 
In(PR)  0.0372 
In(PR)  0.0512 
ln(PR)  0.0536 
In(PR)  0.0548 
In(PR)  0.0325 
In(PR)  0.0079 
In(PR)  0.0318 
In(PR)  0.0644 
In(PR)  0.0350 
In(PR)  0.0409 
In(PR)  0.0769 
In(PR)  0.0313 
In(PI)  0.0507 
In(PI)  -0.0015 
In(PR*)  -0.1615 
ln(PR)  0.0550 
In(PI)  -0.0023 




















0  0.1024 
0  0.1184 
0  0.1977 
0  0.1651 
0  0.1230 
0  0.0548 
0  0.0474 
0  0.0857 
0  0.2208 
0  0.1566 
0  0.0967 
0  0.2303 
0  0.0963 
0  0.2303 
-0.0159  0 
-0.3517  0 
0  0.2194 
-0.0159  0 
-0.3517  0 
cisely measured in the R&D stock regression). Domestic R&D appears to 
respond much more strongly to domestic price terms than it does to foreign 
price terms, suggesting a value of  p that is imprecisely measured but in the 
neighborhood of  0.2-0.3.  The estimated own-price elasticity of  domestic 
R&D for domestic purposes is -  1.3 in the R&D stock regression and -  1.7 
in the flow regression. 
There is an important difficulty that arises in interpreting the OLS results, 
in that the tax prices (for firms with excess foreign tax credits) are endogenous 
to R&D expenditure levels. In order to reduce the bias that accompanies this 
endogeneity, columns 2 and 4 present instrumental variables (Zv)  estimates 
of  (27),  with  instruments constructed by  using  values of  E/(S + S*) and 
S*/(S  + S*)  for the  1984-86  period for each firm in place of  their yearly 
values in constructing price instruments. The ZV estimates yield results that 
are quite similar to their OLS counterparts, though the cross-price effects fall 
in magnitude and the estimated effect of the price of R&D directed at foreign 
markets is now significant in the R&D stock regression. The estimated own- 
price elasticity of domestic R&D for domestic markets is -  1.3 in the stock 
regression and -  1.8 in the flow regression. 
Table 5.6 presents results of the same regressions run on the whole sample 
of  116 firms. The ZV estimates suggest an own-price elasticity of  domestic 
R&D for domestic purposes that is somewhat smaller in magnitude, around 173  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax  Changes 
Table 5.5  R&D Price Responsiveness in Nonmerging Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In  (R&D flow) 
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(0.5845) 
(17.3570) 
(0.21  19) 
-59,0972 
-  0.4605 














-  0.0503 
40 
Note:  Values in parentheses are standard errors. PR and PI are the two domestic tax prices relevant to 
R&D, while PR* and PI* are their foreign counterparts (and are premultiplied by  [S*/S]).  See text for 
description. 
-  0.6 for the R&D stock and -  0.8 for R&D flow. In the stock regression, the 
other price coefficients have estimated standard errors that make them insig- 
nificant, and (except for the coefficient on PI) they are roughly half the size of 
the estimates in table 5.5. In the R&D flow  regression, the coefficients on 
other prices are somewhat smaller than in the regression reported in table 5.5, 
although (except for the coefficient on PR*) they  remain  significant. The 
sample of 116 firms would appear to exhibit less well defined responsiveness 
of  R&D to changes in the tax prices of  R&D, which may in part reflect the 
randomness introduced by the characteristics of their acquired assets and lines 
of business. 
One of the difficulties that arise in estimating (27) is that the price terms on 
the right side are likely to exhibit considerable multicollinearity. The firms 
that experience substantial movements in one price term are likely to show 
simultaneous movements in others. One way  to tighten the precision of  the 
estimates is to restrict the coefficients still further. An attractive restriction to 174  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.6  R&D Price Responsiveness  in 116 Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In  (R&D flow) 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
In(PR)  -0.6645  -0.6425  -0.8566  -  0.8082 
ln(PI)  -  17.3433  -  13.3606  -  46.5677  -  41.9770 
(0.2242)  (0.2727)  (0.3754)  (0.4567) 
(6.5991)  (10.1  127)  (14.3947)  (16.9387) 
(0.0828)  (0.1196)  (0.1386)  (0.2003) 
(4.9956)  (5.6233)  (8.3625)  (9.4189) 
(0.061  1)  (0.0624)  (0.1022)  (0.1045) 
(0.0593)  (0.0593)  (0.0993)  (0.0994) 
(0.061  1)  (0.0612)  (0.1022)  (0.1025) 
(0.0626)  (0.0627)  (0.1047)  (0.1050) 
(0.0607)  (0.0608)  (0.1015)  (0.1019) 
In(PR*)  -0.1 155  -0.1587  -0.2611  -0.3734 
In(PI*)  -9.5135  -9.0595  -28.0481  -29.6616 
Y85(S*/S)  -0.0608  -0.0661  -0.1334  -  0.1480 
Y86(S*lS)  -  0.0600  -0.0595  -  0.0464  -0.0454 
Y 87(S*/S)  -0.0503  -0.0409  0.0170  0.0385 
Y88(S*lS)  -  0.0204  -0.0150  0.1207  0.1343 
Y89(S*lS)  -0.0177  -0.0138  0.1705  0.1805 
Firm dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of firms  116  116  116  116 
6  0.1331  0.1332  0.2228  0.2231 
Note:  Values in parentheses are standard errors. PR and PI are the two domestic tax prices relevant to 
R&D, while PR* and PI* are their foreign counterparts (and are premultiplied by [S*/SJ).  See text for 
description. 
impose is to force p = p* and set their value equal to 0.9. Then (27) can be 
reestimated  with  both  domestic  price  terms  combined  into  a  new  term, 
P = (1 - k)ln(PR) + pln(PZ),  and  similarly for the foreign price terms 
P*  = (1 - p*)[in(PR*> - ln(PR)] + p*[ln(PZ*) - ln(PZ)].32 
Table 5.7 presents estimates of  the restricted regression on a sample of 
thirty-eight of  the firms without  The ZV coefficient estimates are 
quite similar to their values in table 5.5 (recalling that the price terms are 
premultiplied by  new coefficients), suggesting an own-price elasticity of do- 
32. Some specification testing suggested that  = 0.9 fit the R&D stock specification quite 
well. Judging from the results reported in tables 5.5-5.12,  it may be that an appropriate choice of 
p.  for the R&D flow equation would be somewhat larger than 0.9. 
33. Two firms were removed from the sample because there were no others in their two-digit 
SIC industries (in the nonmerging sample) and they had to be dropped for the regressions (table 
5.1  1) that include industry dummy variables. In order to put the regressions reported in tables 5.7, 
5.9, and 5.11 on a comparable basis, these firms were not included in the earlier regressions 
either. When the two additional firms were included, the results in tables 5.7 and 5.9 were virtu- 
ally unchanged. 175  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
Table 5.7  Response to Domestic and Foreign Tax Prices by 38 Nonmerging Firms, 
1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In  (R&D stock)  In (R&D flow) 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
In(P*) 







Number of  firms 
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-  4.4408 
-  0.02 1  8 
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-  16.3360 
(5.793  1) 
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Note;  Values in parentheses are standard errors. P is the domestic tax price relevant to R&D, while P* 
is its foreign counterpart (and is premultiplied by  [S*/S]).  See text for description. 
mestic R&D for domestic markets of -  1.2 in the stock regression and -  1.6 
in the flow regression. The price sensitivity of domestic R&D directed at for- 
eign markets is considerably lower, again implying a value of p between 0.2 
and 0.33. 
Table 5.8 repeats the estimation of this system for the whole sample of 116 
firms. The combined domestic price term in the stock regression is significant 
and slightly  smaller in magnitude  than  its estimated counterparts  in earlier 
regressions,  implying an own-price elasticity of domestic R&D for domestic 
markets of  -0.6. The foreign price effect in the stock regression is estimated 
to be much smaller, again between 0.2 and .25 of the domestic price effect, 
and  is not significantly different  from zero.  The domestic price term in the 
R&D flow equation is considerably smaller than in the estimates reported in 
table 5.6, implying an estimated elasticity of  -0.5  that is not significantly 
different from zero. The foreign price term in this regression is again smaller 
than the domestic price term but is also insignificant. 
One of the difficulties that confronts this analysis is the problem of measur- 
ing the tax price faced by firms in the sample. The tax prices that underlie the 
results reported in tables 5.4 through 5.8 were constructed under the assump- 
tion that firms use the foreign and domestic income figures reported in their 176  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.8  Response to Domestic and Foreign Tax Prices by  116 Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In (R&D flow) 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
InfP)  -  5.9925  -5.6212  -6.3367  -4.9683 
(2.1829)  (2.5556)  (3.676  1)  (4.3043) 
In(P*  j  -0.9137  -  1.3783  -  2.1 102  -2.7268 
(0.82  12)  (  1.1900)  (1.3831)  (2.0043) 
(0.061  1)  (0.0623)  (0.1029)  (0.1050) 
Y85(S*/S)  -  0.0578  -0.0637  -0.1237  -0.1328 
Y86(S*lS)  -  0.0599  -0.0598  -  0.0452  -0.0452 
(0.0594)  (0.0594)  (0.1OOO)  (0. IOOO) 
Y87(S*lS)  -0.0650  -0.0650  -  0.0098  -  0.0099 
(0.0594)  (0.0594)  (0.  IOOO)  (0. IOOO) 
Y  88(S*/S)  -0.0457  -0.0501  0.0626  0.0532 
(0.0599)  (0.0600)  (0.1008)  (0.101  1) 
Y89  (S*/S)  -0.0339  -0.0359  0.1337  0.1305 
Finn dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of firms  116  116  116  116 
6  0.1332  0.1333  0.2244  0.2245 
Note:  Values in parentheses are standard errors. P is the domestic tax price relevant to R&D, while P* 
is its foreign counterpart (and is premultiplied by [S*/S]). See text for description. 
(0.0595)  (0.0596)  (0.1002)  (0.1005) 
10-Ks for R&D allocation on their tax returns. Unfortunately, the definitions 
differ, and they do so in ways that cannot be identified from publicly available 
information. A  firm’s tax  situation depends on a number of  rather subtle 
choices by  the firm, and legal distinctions between observationally similar 
activities of the firm, that make it very difficult to identify their incentives.34 
In  order to  check  the  robustness of  the results presented  in  tables  5.5 
through 5.8 to changes in the specification of tax prices, tables 5.9 and 5.10 
report the results of reestimating (27) under the assumption that all firms use 
the income allocation method to reduce their tax obligations to the point that 
the fractional sales constraint binds. The estimated price elasticities for the 
nonmerging sample of thirty-eight firms, reported in table 5.9, are about half 
34. The U.S. Department of the Treasury (1983)  found that for the small number (twenty-four) 
of firms for which enough data were available on tax returns and in 10-K  filings to observe their 
R&D allocation procedures, it appeared that those firms took more R&D deductions against their 
U.S. taxable income than even the most generous treatment (full use of the income method) would 
have indicated. This does not mean that these firms necessarily took excessive R&D deductions, 
because  there  are several circumstances in  which firms are permitted  to allocate more R&D 
against their domestic income than is provided by  the allocation rule, if the deductions can be 
justified.  All of  this points to the difficulty of using available data-even  confidential tax return 
data-to  measure tax prices exactly. But at the same time, observable tax prices can offer useful 
approximations to the prices firms face. 177  On the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
Table 5.9  Response to (Constrained) Tax Prices by Nonmerging Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In  (R&D flow) 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
W')  -  7.9749  -7.8978  -8.7179  -  8.5307 
(1.693  1)  (  1.6549)  (2.9895)  (2.9928) 
(1.1788)  (1.1791)  (2.1318)  (2.1324) 
(0.0963)  (0.0963)  (0.1742)  (0.1742) 
In(P*)  -  3.0145  -  3.0766  -  3.7677  -3.8940 
Y85(S*lS)  -0.0419  -0.0430  -0.0096  -0.0120 
Y  86(S*lS)  -0.0199  -0.0199  0.0876  0.0877 
(0.0959)  (0.0959)  (0.1735)  (0.1735) 
Y87(S*/S)  -  0.0566  -0.0564  0.1954  0.1960 
(0.0965)  (0.0965)  (0.1746)  (0.1746) 
Y88(S*lS)  -0.0057  -0.0061  0.3554  0.3546 
(0.0964)  (0.0964)  (0.1743)  (0.1743) 
Y89(S*/S)  0.0264  0.0265  0.4342  0.4346 
(0.0963)  (0.0963)  (0.1741)  (0.1741) 
Firm dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Number of firms  38  38  38  38 
6  0.1057  0.1057  0.191  1  0.191  1 
Noret Values in parentheses are standard errors. Tax prices used in the regressions reported in this table 
were constructed under the assumption  that all firms can reduce their tax liabilities using the income 
allocation method, up to the point that the sales allocation method constraint binds. P  is the domestic 
tax price relevant to R&D, while P* is its foreign counterpart (and is premultiplied by  [S*/S]). See text 
for description. 
the magnitude of  the corresponding elasticity estimates in table 5.7: the do- 
mestic price elasticities are -  0.5 in the stock regression and -  0.9 in the flow 
regression. The foreign price elasticities are,  as in table 5.7, considerably 
smaller than their domestic counterparts; and in the R&D flow regression, the 
estimated foreign price elasticity is not significantly different from zero. The 
estimated price elasticities reported in table 5.10 are similar to the estimates 
in table 5.8, with the difference that the magnitudes are slightly smaller and 
the domestic price elasticities are both significantly different from zero ( -  0.4 
in the stock regression and -  0.5 in the flow regression) in table 5.10. 
Another difficulty in interpreting (27) is the omission of  industry-specific 
eXec&.  Fi~ms  in.snmp, industries are more likely than those in others to have 
operations in high-tax foreign locations and to have high &/(S  + S*) ratios. 
If those industries also are the ones that are shrinking relative to other manu- 
facturing industries over the 1987-89  period (for ordinary business reasons 
unrelated to $1.861-8),  then one might mistakenly interpret negative coeffi- 
cients on the price terms to imply an important price effect on R&D when no 
effect is present. One way to avoid such a misinterpretation would be to run 
(27) with industry dummy variables, interacted with time trends, on the right 178  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.10  Response to (Constrained)  Tax Prices by 116 Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In  (R&D flow) 
OLS  IV  OLS  IV 
In(P*) 
Y85(S*/S) 
Y  86(S*/S) 
YS7(S*IS) 
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Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors. Tax prices used in the regressions reported in this table 
were constructed  under the assumption that all firms can reduce their tax liabilities using the income 
allocation method,  up to the point that the sales allocation method constraint binds. P  is the domestic 
tax price relevant to R&D, while P*  is its foreign counterpart (and is premultiplied by  [S*/S]).  See text 
for description. 
side, thereby removing average industry effects on R&D growth. The disad- 
vantage of  this approach is that it also removes the average industry  price 
variation,  leaving only within-industry variation with which to identify the 
effect of tax prices on R&D. The remaining variation may not always be ade- 
quate to identify price effects precisely. 
Tables 5.11 and 5.12  present estimates of (27) that include on the right side 
time trends interacted with industry dummy variables for each of the two-digit 
SIC manufacturing industries listed in table 5  .4.35  Because these regressions 
are intended to probe the robustness of the specification of (27), the tax prices 
used in these regressions were constructed under the assumption that all firms 
use the income method (up to the sales method constraint) to allocate their 
R&D  deduction^.^^ The estimated coefficients on tax price variables in tables 
35. To  be specific, the industry growth dummy variables take values of zero for firms outside 
the (two-digit SIC) industry, while for firms in the industry the values are one in 1985, two in 
1986, and so on. For a more subtle treatment of interindustry differences in R&D growth rates, 
see Pakes and Schankerman (1984a). 
36. Very similar results were obtained in specifications with industry growth variables included 
on the right side but tax prices calculated in the standard manner (as in tables 5.7 and 5.8). 179  On the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax  Changes 
Table 5.11  Response to (Constrained) Tax Prices, Industry Effects Removed, by 
Nonmerging Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In (R&D flow) 

























































































Nore: Values in parentheses  are standard errors. Tax prices used in the regressions reported in this table 
were constructed  under the assumption that all firms can reduce their tax liabilities using the income 
allocation method, up to the point that the sales allocation method constraint binds.  Industry growth 
dummies are industry-specific constant time trends. P  is the domestic tax price relevant to R&D,  while 
P*  is its foreign counterpart (and is premultiplied by [S*/S]). See text for description. 
5.1 1 and 5.12 remain negative but are generally only half of the magnitude of 
the corresponding coefficients in tables 5.9 and 5.10; also, although they are 
significant in the R&D stock regressions (except for the foreign price coeffi- 
cient in the large sample regression reported in table 5.12), estimated price 
effects become insignificant in the R&D flow regressions. It appears that re- 
moving the variation in prices between industries simply leaves too little vari- 
ation to identify the price effects very precisely. An alternative interpretation 
would be  that the price effects that  appear in  tables 5.5 through 5.10 are 
simply spurious correlations, but this interpretation would not square with the 
results from the R&D stock regressions. 
The results described in tables 5.5 through 5.12 present a consistent picture 
of R&D activity that is sensitive to the tax changes introduced after 1986. The 
evidence in the tables suggests, however, that tax changes that affected the 
after-tax profitability of R&D performed in the United States and directed at 
foreign markets had significantly less impact than the tax changes that affected 180  James R. Hines, Jr. 
Table 5.12  Response to (Constrained)  Tax Prices, Industry Effects Removed, by  116 
Firms, 1984-1989 
Dependent Variable:  Dependent Variable: 
In (R&D stock)  In (R&D flow) 
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Note; Values in parentheses are standard errors. Tax prices used in the regressions reported in  this table 
were constructed under the assumption that all firms can reduce their tax liabilities using the income 
allocation method, up to the point that the sales allocation method constraint binds. Industry growth 
dummies are industry-specific constant time trends. P is the domestic tax price relevant to R&D, while 
P*  is its foreign counterpart (and is premultiplied by  [S*/S]).  See text for description. 
the after-tax profitability of R&D performed in the United States and directed 
at the American market. The foreign market effect is smaller than that for 
the domestic market, even when corrected for firms' relative sales in the two 
markets. 
Why the foreign market effect should be so much smaller is unclear. One 
possibility is that measurement error reduces the estimated magnitude of what 
is truly a substantial effect. There is no doubt that the heterogeneity of foreign 
markets, and foreign tax rates, makes the average foreign price measures PR* 
and PI* only approximations to the true tax prices of  performing R&D for 
foreign markets. Another possibility is that the analysis might fail to find the 
true effect because it is not possible to identify separately the changes in off- 
shore R&D performed by subsidiaries of U.S. firms.37  But the third, and per- 
37. For an exploratory study of the determinants  of offshore R&D by  U.S. firms, see Mansfield, 
Teece ,  and Romeo ( 1979). 181  On the Sensitivity of  R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
Table 5.13  Royalties Paid versus R&D Devoted to Foreign Sources, based on Relative 
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Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (various years); National Science Foundation (1991). 
Note: Data are limited to manufacturing industries only. 
haps most likely, possibility is that firms do not concentrate on foreign tax 
factors when undertaking R&D in the United States. This is likely to be the 
case if, in fact, domestic R&D does not greatly promote foreign profitability 
relative to its effect on domestic profitability.38 
It is difficult to assess this third possibility, because some R&D performed 
in the United States clearly is directed primarily at foreign markets, whereas 
other R&D activities are directed at the U.S. market. Table 5.13 offers some 
aggregate evidence on the relationship between the foreign sales share of U.S. 
affiliates (multiplied by U.S. domestic R&D), and their use of domestic U.S. 
technology, as reflected in royalty payments to the United States. It appears 
that royalty payments equal only about half of  the foreign share based on a 
simple sales formula. There are, of  course, several possible explanations for 
the pattern displayed in table 5.13. The aggregate R&D figures represent the 
sum of  firms with and without foreign affiliates. There might be long delays 
between expenditures on R&D and the production of  know-how that would 
merit the payment of  a royalty. Firms may not pay  the royalties that they 
should according to arm’s-length pricing  principle^.^^ But another possibility 
is that R&D in the United States is directed primarily at domestic markets. 
38. Or if  its effects on foreign profitability appears only after considerable time has elapsed. 
Mansfield and Romeo (1980) find that new technologies developed in the United States are trans- 
ferred to industrialized  foreign countries six years, on average, after they are first used in U.S. 
production.  It would undoubtedly be a mistake to conclude that domestic R&D has no influence 
on foreign profitability; for example, Flaherty (1984) documents the importance of technological 
leadership for market shares of foreign affiliates of U.S. firms. Furthermore, manufacturing ex- 
ecutives undertake R&D projects anticipating that a substantial fraction (though less than half) of 
the returns will come in foreign markets, according to the survey results presented in Mansfield, 
Romeo, and Wagner (1979). 
39. Kopits (1976) offers evidence that multinationals systematically adjust their royalty pay- 
ments to pursue global tax-minimizing strategies. Given the tax-favored status of royalty receipts 
in the United States, this argument implies that the royalty might be overstated rather than under- 
stated. 182  James R. Hines, Jr. 
5.5  Alternative Tax Structures 
The price responsiveness of  R&D as estimated in tables 5.7 and 5.8 sug- 
gests that proposed changes in the tax treatment of R&D might have observ- 
able, if  small, effects on the R&D efforts of U.S. multinationals. In this sec- 
tion, I examine the likely consequences of two reforms. One alternative to the 
current tax system is to restore the system that existed from 1981 to 1986, in 
which U.S. multinationals effectively could deduct 100 percent of their R&D 
for tax purposes. The second proposal, advocated by  McIntyre (1989) and 
others, is to allocate U.S. R&D expenses on the basis of foreign and domestic 
sales without an  initial fractional apportionment against U. S. income and 
without optional income apportionment. 
Table 5.14 presents both proposals’ estimated effects on revenue and R&D 
levels, based on data from a somewhat expanded set of  189 firms for 1989. 
(Firms were  included if  enough data were available to  construct their re- 
sponses to the proposed tax changes in  1989.) Collectively, these 189 firms 
had $41 billion of R&D expenditures in  1989, representing half of the total 
R&D expenditure reported for all 2,800 Compustat firms in 1989. The reve- 
nue consequences of the proposed reforms were calculated on the assumption 
that any tax-induced changes in levels of  R&D represent flows of resources 
between equally taxed activities and hence do not affect tax revenues. In order 
to convert changes in R&D stocks into yearly flows for presentation in table 
5.14, the 1989 ratio of aggregate R&D expenditure to aggregate R&D stock 
(20.8 percent) was multiplied by the implied changes in R&D stocks from the 
reforms. 
Using reported foreign and domestic incomes and foreign tax rates to cal- 
culate tax liabilities, a reform that permitted firms to deduct 100 percent of 
their R&D expenses against U.S. income would have cost the U.S. Treasury 
$1.2 billion from these 189 firms in  1989. In return, U.S. firms would have 
increased their domestic R&D expenditures by somewhere between $1.4 bil- 
lion and $2.2 billion, in which the $2.2 billion figure is constructed from the 
estimated elasticity of R&D flow, while the $1.4 billion figure represents the 
change in long-run flow corresponding to the stock change constructed from 
stock demand estimates.40 
The alternative of apportioning R&D expenses 100 percent on the basis of 
foreign and domestic sales would have even more dramatic consequences. 
Again taking observed foreign tax rates to be reliable, sales apportionment 
would yield an additional $2.5 billion in tax revenue from these 189 firms. As 
a consequence of sales apportionment, these firms would be expected to re- 
40. R&D responses reported in table 5.14 are based on coefficients estimated using the non- 
merging sample; they are reported in table 5.7, columns 2 and 4. The estimated change in R&D 
stock from moving to 100 percent domestic deductibility is $7.0 biHion. If there are no adjustment 
costs,  then  the first-year change in  R&D  expenditure  might  be of  this  magnitude,  with  the 
(smaller) figure in the text indicating the annual flow to which this corresponds. 183  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
Table 5.14  Estimated Effects of 'ho  Policy Reforms on R&D and Tax Revenue 
(current $ millions) 
Change in R&D 
Change in Tax  Flow  Stock 
Contemplated Reform  Revenue  Estimates  Estimates 
100 percent domestic  $-  1,166  $2,230  $1,444 
deductibility 
Pure sales apportionment  2,542  -  2,590  -  1,783 
Note: Figures  are based on  189 multinational  firms with $41 billion of  R&D expenditures  in 
1989. Firms are assumed to use the sales apportionment method to allocate their R&D deduc- 
tions. The flow estimates of R&D change are constructed from the estimated price responsiveness 
of  the  nonmerging  sample  (table  5.7, col. 4).  The stock estimates  of  R&D change are also 
constructed  from the estimated price responsiveness of the nonmerging sample (table 5.7, col. 
2), with the estimated stock adjustment converted into an annual flow equivalent by applying the 
1989 ratio of R&D flow to R&D stock. 
duce their domestic R&D by between  $1.8 billion (constructed  from stock 
demand  estimates)  and  $2.6 billion  (constructed  from  flow  demand  esti- 
mate~).~' 
These results suggest that R&D undertaken  by U.S. multinationals  is not 
likely to change dramatically in response  to either of  the contemplated  tax 
reforms,  largely  because  the  changes  themselves  are  rather  minor  when 
framed in the broader context of R&D policy. Nevertheless,  the changes in 
R&D  that  would  accompany  the  reforms  slightly  exceed  the  tax  revenue 
changes they  would  induce.  The U.S. Department of  the Treasury (1983) 
study offers similar findings, though it does so from different premises.4z  In 
particular,  the estimates of R&D price elasticities that can be found in the 
literature are so small that they would not typically support the kind of conclu- 
sions presented in this paper or assumed in the Treasury  The reason 
may have to do with the difficulty of  finding exogenous price changes. Re- 
searchers typically use time-series variation in prices, making it impossible to 
41. The stock estimates correspond to a change in R&D stock demand of $8.6 billion. 
42. The Treasury study uses the rather low range of elasticities available in the literature but 
applies them to the average, rather than marginal, prices firms face; these two differences from 
the present study roughly equal each other, so the final results are similar (though they can differ 
by a factor of two). 
43. See, for example, Bernstein and Nadiri (1989), who estimate R&D price elasticities to be 
between  -0.4  and  -0.5  for a sample of manufacturing firms, while Nadiri and Prucha (1989) 
find the R&D price elasticity to be much closer to zero for the U.S.  Bell System. In a study of 
Canadian firms, Bernstein (1985) reports estimated R&D price elasticities of between -  0.1 and 
-0.4.  Mansfield (1986) and the GAO study (U.S. General Accounting Office 1989) summarize 
the literature with the conclusion that the consensus range of price elasticities is  -0.2  to -  0.5. 
The price elasticity one expects may be a matter of judgment, but many observers find the -  0.2 
to  -0.5  range to be unreasonably close to zero. Certainly firms claim to be influenced by  after- 
tax prices; Brown (1984) reports that two-thirds of the executives included in a 1984 Conference 
Board survey anticipated that tax incentives would influence their R&D expenditures over the next 
one to three years. 184  James R. Hines, Jr. 
exploit firm-specific variations and raising a number of  problems related to 
omitted variables and the endogeneity of prices. 
It is important to interpret the policy simulations with caution. The  189 
firms on which the calculations are based do not represent all of the firms that 
would be affected by the envisioned changes, though these firms perform half 
of  the country’s R&D and, because these are the firms with (on average) the 
highest foreign sales concentrations, they are likely to represent by  far the 
majority of the impact of $1.861-8  changes. There are, however, some limi- 
tations in the way that the revenue implications are calculateda and also some 
restrictive assumptions built  into the estimated R&D responses to  the tax 
changes.45 
5.6  Conclusion 
The ability of  U.S.  multinationals to deduct their U.S.  R&D expenses 
against U.S. income for tax purposes has changed many times over the past 
fifteen years. It appears that U.S.  multinationals have changed their R&D 
spending behavior, albeit mildly, in response. The estimates presented in this 
paper imply that domestic R&D spending responds to changes in the after-tax 
price of  R&D with an elasticity between -  1.2 and -  1.6. This elasticity is 
considerably higher than estimates found in the literature. 
44. Some of the firms in the sample may have (in 1989) used the income allocation method to a 
greater degree than it appears from their financial data. Under the assumption that all of the 189 
firms were able to exploit the income allocation method to the limit in 1989, replacing the existing 
system with  100 percent domestic deductibility  was estimated to reduce tax revenues by  $368 
million a year, while moving to pure sales allocation would raise revenues by $3.341 billion. A 
second adjustment to estimated tax revenues might come in response to induced changes in R&D. 
The revenue estimates are constructed to show the first-order revenue effect of changing the de- 
ductibility of current levels of R&D; any induced changes are assumed to be financed by reducing 
the level of other similarly taxed activities.  If, instead, greater R&D in the economy generates 
greater tax revenue, either by drawing resources out of untaxed activities or by stimulating greater 
aggregate productivity through spillovers into other firms and industries, then tax cuts that stimu- 
late R&D do not reduce tax revenues by as much as first-order calculations suggest. 
45. The contemplated policy reforms would influence aggregate R&D, and the endogeneity of 
the prices of products produced by R&D attenuate the effects of the tax changes on R&D. The 
model is estimated on the basis of firms’ reported R&D; if firms have some flexibility in what they 
call R&D, then some part of the estimated responsiveness of R&D may reflect reporting choices 
rather than resource allocations. The estimation of the elasticity parameters ignores the role of the 
R&D tax credit, which may (or may not) serve to accentuate the incentives created by changes in 
$1.861-8; consequently, the estimated elasticities couldbe too great. On the other hand, the esti- 
mates also ignore the role of foreign tax credit carryforwards and carrybacks, which probably 
biases the estimates toward zero. A number of tax changes introduced in 1986  discouraged invest- 
ment in plant and equipment and may thereby have influenced R&D spending; for an analysis of 
the interaction between R&D and other capital, see Lach and Schankerman (1989) and Hall and 
Hayashi (1989). The data are unable to distinguish domestic from foreign R&D, so a firm might 
reduce its domestic R&D in response to the tax changes and nevertheless appear to be unaffected. 
The role of  aggregate  R&D incentives in changing the strategic environments  in which firms 
operate (see, for example, Meron and Caves 1990) is ignored, as are effects of direct government 
funding of private R&D (for analyses, see Levy and Terleckyj 1983; Scott 1984; and Lichtenberg 
1987). It appears that the weight of  these limitations is to bias the estimated R&D price elasticities 
toward zero, but it is difficult to know for sure. 185  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
These estimates imply that some proposed changes in the tax treatment of 
R&D are unlikely to have an enormous impact on the level of  research and 
development in the United States. Nevertheless, by making R&D performed 
in  the United States  100 percent deductible against  U.S. taxes, Congress 
would stimulate between $1.4 billion and $2.2 billion in additional annual 
R&D spending. This change would reduce U.S. government tax revenues by 
$1.2 billion annually. An alternative policy of requiring multinationals to al- 
locate their R&D deductions purely on the basis of foreign and domestic sales 
would reduce their annual R&D by between $1.8 billion and $2.6 billion but 
would raise $2.5 billion in yearly tax revenues. Whether either of these reform 
plans represent likely future alternatives may well depend on whether Con- 
gress feels that increased R&D or increased tax revenue is a more important 
national goal. 
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Comment  Bronwyn H. Hall 
James Hines’s paper addresses the question of whether the complex and fre- 
quent changes to the tax treatment of R&D performed by multinational cor- 
porations in the United States during the 1980s had any incentive effects on 
the actual level and direction of such R&D. Interest in this topic is motivated 
by a general interest in the  optimal tax treatment of R&D and by specific 
interest in the effects of the many changes incorporated into the tax legislation 
of the Reagan era. Hines summarizes the features of the tax code that apply to 
Bronwyn H. Hall is assistant professor of economics at the University of California at Berkeley 
and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research. 188  James R.  Hines, Jr. 
R&D and uses them to construct tax prices for R&D directed toward domestic 
and foreign sales. He then estimates the factor demand equation for R&D as a 
function of these changing tax prices and uses the estimates to perform a series 
of policy simulations. His conclusions are twofold: first, the tax price elastic- 
ity of R&D expenditure is actually fairly high (approximately unit); second, 
the overall effects of the changes were not that large when benefits (in terms 
of increased R&D spending) and costs (reduced tax revenue) are canceled out. 
The paper consists of two parts: a careful description of the changes in the 
tax treatment of R&D during the 1980s, with an emphasis on the implications 
of these changes for multinationals, and an empirical evaluation of the respon- 
siveness of R&D to these changes for 116 multinational firms. The first part 
performs a real service to the economics research community, because these 
tax changes are complex and difficult to summarize in a concise way.  Hines 
does an excellent job of presenting them and analyzing their likely impact. I 
do not have much to add to this presentation, except to emphasize that the 
most important subsidy to R&D that arises from the combined effects of the 
tax system facing multinationals is due to a part of the system not under con- 
trol of the U.S. government: the low tax rates imposed on the income that is 
repatriated to the United States as royalty income (see table 5.2 of the paper). 
To the extent that corporations are in an excess foreign tax credit situation, as 
most of them are (see table 5.3 of the paper), this subsidy is substantial. 
Most of my comments will be directed toward the second part of the paper, 
which presents empirical evidence on the effects of these tax changes. I want 
to emphasize at the outset that, in spite of my reservations about what can and 
cannot be learned from these data,  I found reading and thinking about the 
research described in this paper extremely helpful, and I compliment Hines 
both on his clear presentation of complex tax laws and on the careful empirical 
work with which he measures their effects. My remarks begin with a general 
discussion of the characteristics of R&D investment and their implications for 
interpretation of the results here; this is followed by  some discussion of the 
interpretation of the tax price formulas presented in the paper. Finally, I make 
more specific comments on the model and empirical results. 
The first important fact about R&D is that its output is largely nonrivalrous, 
which implies that a large fraction of the results of R&D can be used in many 
markets simultaneously. This is  in  fact a major cause of  the movement of 
corporations across  borders:  a  desire to  reap  the  fruits  of  a unique rent- 
producing factor (a new innovation) in a broader market. Only a small fraction 
of R&D will be performed specifically to satisfy the requirements of a partic- 
ular market. This limits the extent to which R&D can be directed toward sales 
in a single foreign market and implies that one does not expect a strong tax 
price response of R&D expenditures to changes in allocation rules. This does 
not mean, however, that an overall response to changes in tax prices (which 
may be induced by changes in allocation rules) would not be observed, and 
this is exactly what Hines documents in this paper. Later in this discussion, I 189  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax  Changes 
will come back to this issue of what Hines can and cannot measure with the 
data he has available. 
From a policy perspective, other implications of the nonrivalrous nature of 
R&D spending are twofold: first, if much of the output of R&D spending is 
shared across domestic and foreign sales, worries about subsidizing foreign 
consumption as well as domestic while subsidizing R&D spending do not 
seem that important because the cost is small. Second, the fact that R&D has 
positive externalities suggests that too little R&D will be performed if  the 
performance is left entirely to a private sector facing full prices for R&D. As 
Hines says, this is the view taken by Congress quite frequently when writing 
tax legislation. If  you believe the positive externality argument, you would 
not choose the tax treatment of R&D as an instrument for raising tax revenue. 
To  put it another way, the benefits due to increased R&D spending by corpo- 
rations,  properly  measured,  may  exceed  the  cost  of  the  tax  subsidy  by 
amounts greater than that which are measured by Hines when he simply adds 
up the additional R&D thus induced. 
A second, frequently documented, characteristic of R&D is its relative lack 
of  volatility compared to ordinary investment (see, among others, Bernstein 
and Nadiri 1989; Hall and Hayashi 1989; Lach and Schankerman 1989; Him- 
melberg and Petersen 1990; Hall 1992), a fact that most of these researchers 
interpret as implying fairly high adjustment costs for R&D spending. This 
view is supported by the fact that about half of R&D spending is the salaries 
of highly trained technical personnel, who are not easily hired and fired with- 
out losing the part of the firm’s R&D capital that is embodied in their human 
capital. This has two implications for the Hines paper: first, the relatively 
large price elasticity he observes for R&D spending is somewhat surprising 
and worth further investigation in order to reconcile it with the results of oth- 
ers who have estimated factor demand equations for R&D; second, the omis- 
sion of adjustment costs from his model of production could be an obstacle to 
interpretation of his results relative to those of others. 
The centerpiece of Hines’s theoretical and empirical analysis of  the R&D 
behavior of multinationals is the derivation of the tax prices faced by  these 
firms, which are treated as the primary predetermined instruments which shift 
the demand for R&D investment. These prices are derived by positing a profit- 
maximizing firm with a profit function which is additively separable in the 
foreign and domestic operations. For all the reasons I suggested earlier, the 
weakest part of  the model is that R&D must be specifically directed toward 
foreign or domestic markets in this framework and that these markets are not 
allowed to interact. In fact, in the estimation, Hines allows the responsiveness 
of R&D to the foreign sales tax price to differ from that for the domestic, and 
the resulting estimated coefficient (p  0.2) suggests that R&D directed spe- 
cifically toward foreign sales is “piggybacking” on domestic R&D by a fairly 
wide margin (since p would be unity if the two markets were completely sepa- 
rate). 190  James R. Hines, Jr. 
To  analyze somewhat more clearly the tax prices Hines derives and the in- 
centives for investment they provide, I make a slight change in notation. In so 
doing, I also subscript the variables explicitly by  i (firm) and t (year) in order 
to highlight the sources of variation in these prices. Define the share of sales 
which is foreign as 
lr  = S*/(S + S*) 
r;, = R/(S + S*). 
and the worldwide R&D intensity as 
Both of these variables are observable in the data. With 
equations (6) and (7) can be written 
these definitions, text 
and 
These equations imply that, for multinationals, R&D directed only toward 
domestic sales is  more expensive than other ordinary (nondepreciable) ex- 
penses to the extent that the allocation rules do not allow such R&D to be 
completely allocated to domestic income (a,  > O).' However, the reverse is 
true for R&D directed toward foreign sales. Using the same notation, text 
equations (1  3) and (14) for the foreign tax prices become 
and 
1 - w* 
PI*  = 
1 - W* -  Tztarfiyit' 
where I have suppressed the firm and year subscripts for w*  because that re- 
flects Hines's construction of  this variable. These equations imply that the 
relative price of  foreign R&D differs from that  of  ordinary inputs by  two 
terms: 
7. -  W*  T.af  +-  --  -1-L  PR* 
PI*  1 - w*  1 -  w*' 
1. Such R&D will still be cheaper than ordinary investment, however, to the extent that ordi- 
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Thus, the relative price of this type of R&D is reduced by a factor propor- 
tional to the difference in tax rates in the two localities and increased by a term 
similar to that for domestic R&D; the latter term arises because of the alloca- 
tion rules. For plausible values of the parameters, the first term dominates and 
R&D  is subsidized relative to other inputs to the extent that it is a cost of 
foreign sales. Table 5A.  1 emphasizes the point that the dominant difference in 
these tax prices is the light taxation of foreign royalty income for firms with 
excess foreign  tax  credits.  To  first order,  the  relative  subsidy  to  foreign- 
directed R&D is equal to the difference in tax rates on domestic and foreign 
income for these firms and does not depend on the allocation rules or share of 
foreign sales. It is all the more unfortunate, then, that Hines does not have 
good measures of w* available and must use a single value, 5 percent, for all 
firms. 
Turning to  a discussion of  the  measurement of  the impact the tax  law 
changes during the 1980s had on R&D spending, which is the main focus of 
the paper, I first point out that estimating the effects of  these tax changes on 
R&D is a challenge, using the data that are available. From Compustat, one 
has relatively good data on the behavior of the multinational firm as a whole: 
sales, R&D  spending, profit and loss statement, and so forth. However, the 
only data available that separate foreign and domestic activities are for sales 
and  profits,  from the Geographic Segment File.  There are no public  data 
available2  on R&D directed toward foreign sales (or R&D performed in for- 
eign countries), if indeed such a concept makes any sense. The implication is 
that ultimately the estimated response of R&D  spending to two di’erent  tax 
prices, one for R&D directed toward domestic sales and one for R&D directed 
toward  foreign sales,  is identified only through strong functional form as- 
sumptions. This forces Hines to use a rather peculiar hybrid model, one that 
describes the investment response to R&D  tax prices by  deriving it from a 
traditional profit or production function which does not contain any costs of 
adjustment for R&D (or ordinary) capital and which assumes additively sepa- 
rable profit functions across domestic and foreign operations. For all the rea- 
sons I mentioned earlier, this latter assumption seems highly questionable in 
the case of R&D spending. The former leads to confusion in the estimation, 
since it is not clear whether the appropriate variable is the stock of  R&D, 
which is what would enter the production or profit function, or the flow of 
R&D, which is what would respond to the tax price. If adjustment costs were 
zero, this would not matter, but most researchers have estimated very substan- 
tial adjustment costs for R&D (references cited earlier). 
In spite of these reservations, I think the derivation of the actual estimating 
2. The Bureau of the Census collects data at the firm level for the National Science Foundation, 
but  such data are confidential and not released to the public except as aggregate statistics. See 
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Table SA. 1  Illustrative Tax Prices for Multinational Corporations* 
Yearst  alpha  r(RIS)  PR  PI  PRIPI  PR*  PI*  PR*IPI* 
1982-86  0.0%  0.0%  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.63  1.00 
0.0  5.0  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.63  1.00 
0.0  10.0  1.00  1.00  1.00  0.63  1.00 
1988-89  36.0  0.0  1.08  1.00  1.08  0.68  1.00 
36.0  5.0  1.08  1.00  1.08  0.69  1.00 
36.0  10.0  1.07  0.99  1.08  0.69  1.01 
1987  50.0  0.0  1.12  1.00  1.12  0.71  1.00 
50.0  5.0  1.11  0.99  1.12  0.71  1.00 
50.0  10.0  1.10  0.99  1.12  0.71  1.01 
1977-8 1  70.0  0.0  1.16  1.00  1.16  0.73  1.00 
70.0  5.0  1.15  0.99  1.16  0.74  1.01 













~~~~~~  ~  ~ 
Note; Foreign sales = 35%; Corporate tax rate  = 40%; Foreign tax rate = 5%. 
*Tax prices are for a firm  with excess foreign tax credits. 
?Shows the period for which the allocation rule was approximately equal to alpha. 
equation is a tour de force, given the lack of  the variables needed for the 
original two-region model. Hines begins with profit functions for domestic 
and foreign sales separately as functions of  domestic and foreign R&D and 
other inputs, respectively, and derives a kind of  factor demand equation for 
total R&D as a function of tax prices for the two different types of R&D. This 
factor demand equation is in the dual form, where total R&D spending is a 
function of all four tax prices (because of substitution effects in inputs). Equa- 
tion (25) of  the paper makes it clear that if  the production functions for the 
two regions, foreign and domestic, are the same, so that p, = p,  and p,  = 
p4,  there is in effect a single price for each input which is the weighted sum of 
foreign and domestic prices with  weights equal to the respective shares of 
R&D in the total R&D expenditure. The fact that the estimated responses 
differ by  a factor of four or so implies that the production function does not 
have the simple additively separable form assumed by Hines or that the mea- 
surement error in the foreign tax price of R&D is very large. I incline more 
toward the first explanation, although the second must also be playing a role. 
Hines uses equation (27) of  the paper to estimate the price responsiveness 
of  R&D investment in several different ways; all of  them involve using firm 
and year dummies, so that the only variability which is being used  is that 
within firm. The key experiment is to relate movements of real R&D expend- 
itures over time to changes in the prices of R&D, which are given by  equa- 
tions (Cl) and (C2) (in this comment). These equations show that the key 
sources of variability across firms are changes in the fraction of sales that are 
foreign, changes in their marginal tax rates, and changes in R&D infensity. 
The tax prices are inversely proportional to this last variable; because R&D 
itself is the dependent variable, this means that negative simultaneity bias is 193  On the Sensitivity of R&D to Delicate Tax Changes 
likely to be present in the ordinary least squares estimates. For this reason, I 
prefer  the instrumental variable  estimates reported  in the paper, although I 
think the choice of instrument (average firm R&D intensity for 1984-86)  is 
not likely to be completely free of this bias. It is possible that the relatively 
large price elasticities that Hines obtains ( -  1  .O rather than the -  0.2 to -  0.5 
range reported in the literature;  see the paper for references) are due to this 
simultaneity bias. 
In summary, although I have doubts about the exact methodology used and 
numbers reported in this paper, I think Hines has shown us the way to do a far 
more careful evaluation of the effects of tax policy on R&D. I would hope that 
future work that examines the impact of the R&D tax credit on the R&D be- 
havior of corporations would take advantage of the tax price variability avail- 
able when one studies multinational  corporations, which are an increasingly 
large share of the firms involved in R&D. It is quite possible that changes in 
R&D allocation rules have a far greater impact than playing with the R&D tax 
credit. 
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